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COMPETITION VERSUS REGULATION:
THE AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION IN THE
MOTOR CARRIER ACT
CARL H. FULDA*

Transportation of passengers or property by motor carriers engaged
in interstate or foreign commerce has been subject to federal regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission since 1935. At that time
motor carriers in intrastate commerce were regulated in all the states
of the Union by state commissions which controlled entry into the
industry, rates, and safety of operations, but there was no comparable
federal regulation. The Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, now part
II of the Interstate Commerce Act,' was intended to fill this gap by
creating a federal regulatory scheme similar to that provided by the
states. In addition, the Act was deemed necessary as "a part of a complete and coordinated program of legislation touching all forms of
transportation." 2 Indeed, the 1934 Report of the Federal Coordinator
of Transportation had called attention to the fact that the various
modes of transportation "interlock and react, one against another, in
a multitude of ways." Hence, he suggested that "the system cannot
3
permanently be half regulated and half unregulated."
Nevertheless, the Motor Carrier Act contains a number of specifically described exemptions from economic regulation, the most important of which relate to agriculture. 4 Thus, motor vehicles controlled
and operated by a farmer when used in carrying agricultural commodities from and supplies to the farm, and vehicles of cooperative associations as defined in the Agriculture Marketing Act are exempt from
control as to entry into the business and rates and charges; they remain
subject to regulation pertaining to qualifications of drivers and safety
of operations. 5 The same status is accorded to:
motor vehicles used in carrying property consisting of ordinary livestock,
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. This article will be integrated into a text on "Competition in the Regulated Industries" to be published
by Little, Brown & Company.

1. 49 STAT. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1952), as amended
49 U.S.C. §§ 303-05, 315, 321 (Supp. IV, 1957).
2. H. R. REP. No. 1645, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, 5 (1935). The program was
completed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (52 STAT. 977, 49 U.S.C. § 401722 (1952), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 421, 481, 483, 486, 683-84, 722 (Supp. IV,
1957)), and Parts M and IV of the Interstate Commerce Act: Water Carriers
(54 STAT. 929 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-23 (1952)) and Freight Forwarders (56
STAT. 284 (1942), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-22 (1952), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1020

(Supp. IV, 1957)).

3. H. R. Doc. No. 89, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1935).

4. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (b) (1952).
5. 49 U.S.C. §§ 303(b) (4a), (5) (1952).
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fish (including shell fish), or agricultural (including horticultural) commodities (not including manufactured products thereof), if such motor
vehicles are not used in carrying any other property, or passengers, for
compensation. 6
Consequently, interstate trucking is divided into a regulated and an
unregulated segment, and it is precisely this dual treatment which has
caused continuing controversies in the administrative, judicial and
legislative arenas. Obviously, railroads and common and contract
motor carriers subject to supervision bythe Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to their rates and services 7 and unable to operate
without Commission approval 8 cannot help resenting the existence of
a considerable number of motor carriers free from these restrictions.
Since administrative control over exempt carriers is limited to the
enforcement of safety rules, 9 their freedom to compete with the regulated carriers is regarded by the latter as an unfair and intolerable
threat.10 The Interstate Commerce Commission itself has recommended
legislation to narrow the agricultural exemption." By contrast, spokesmen for farm, dairy and fishery organizations vigorously defend the
exemption and oppose all changes of the present law.'2
6. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (b) (6) (1952).
7. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, 6, 15, 312, 316-318 (1952), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§6 (Supp. IV, 1957).
8. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(19), (20), 306-309 (1952).
9. A. W. Hawkins, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1957)
(Conviction of motor carrier of milk for falsifying records affirmed; "carriers
of agricultural commodities are not exempt from keeping proper logs . . .
pertaining to hours of service.")
10. See testimony of spokesmen for the railroads in "Study of Domestic
Land and Water Transportation," Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Domestic Land and Water Transportation of Senate Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, pursuant to S. REs. No. 50, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 234-41
(1950) (hereafter cited as Transportation Hearings 1950), and in "Domestic
Land and Water Transportation," Hearings before the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 431-36 (1952) (hereafter cited as Transportation Hearings 1952). See also Helmetag (Asst. Gen.
Counsel, Pennsylvania Railroad Co.), Judicial Expansion of the Agricultural
Exemption in the Motor CarrierIndustry, 43 VA. L.R. 211, 225 (1957), recommending repeal of the exemption. For testimony of representatives of the
regulated truckers see TransportationHearings 1950, supra, at 753-818, 855-58,
and TransportationHearings 1952, supra, at 372-80, 473-75, 496-509; on page
403, Senator Bricker commented: "Of course transportation is a part of the
public utility field ... The problem that we have got here is whether or not
a portion of it shall remain regulated and a portion of it remain untouched
and whether or not one segment of the shipping public will be served with
an unregulated free enterprise system and the rest of the public will be
submitted to a regulated carrier system." The Executive Committee of
American Trucking Associations, in a statement of policy adopted on January
25, 1957, recommends legislation to narrow the agricultural exemption.
11. ICC, 70TH ANN. REP. 162 (1956). This recommendation would be carried
out by S. 1689 and H.R. 5823, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). See also S. 2553,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) for another proposal to narrow the exemption.
12. Transportation Hearings 1950, supra note 10, at 534-35, 909-23, 1170,
1171, 1259-64, 1366-71; TransportationHearings 1952, supra note 10, at 380-92,
406-20, 436-9, 442-73, 476-84, 515-16. See also Senate Select Committee on
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What is the present law? And what are the merits or demerits of
proposals for a change?
I.
The statutory language quoted above13 has been the subject of much
litigation before the Commission in the courts. Wlhile the Commission
has consistently interpreted that language narrowly, the courts have
moved in the opposite direction. Congress seemingly supported this
judicial trend by amendments which expanded the exemption beyond
its original scope.
As enacted in 1935, the exemption referred to
motor vehicles used exclusively in carrying livestock, fish (including
shell fish), or agricultural commodities (not including manufactured
products thereof) .... 14
In 1938 the word "exclusively" was deleted, and the phrase "if such
motor vehicles are not used in carrying any other property, or passengers, for compensation" was added at the end. 15 The significance of
these amendments was explicitly acknowledged by the Commission
in Newman ContractCarrierApplication16 where it held that a carrier
of apples from orchards to produce houses was exempt although he
leased his equipment for the return trip to other carriers for transpor17
tation of nonexempt commodities.
Subsequently, however, the Commission took the position that operating authority is required whenever a carrier of exempt commodities
also uses his vehicles at some other time for transportation of nonexempt goods. Thus, in ICC v. Dunn,18 the Commission sought an injunction to restrain a carrier engaged in intrastate transportation
under a certificate issued by the Georgia Public Service Commission
from using his trucks in hauling baled cotton to points in adjacent
states. Nothing else was carried on these trips. In affirming a judgment
adverse to the Commission, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit squarely held that the construction urged by the CornSmall Business, Competition, Regulation, and the Public Interest in the Motor

CarrierIndustry, S.

REP.

No. 1693, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-18 (1956).

13. See text to note 6 supra.
14. 49 STAT. 545 (1935) (later. amended by 52
919 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 303 (b) (6) (1952)).
15. 52 STAT. 1237 (1938) (later amended by 54
§ 303 (b)(6)1952)).

STAT.

1237 (1938), 54 -STAT.

STAT.

919 (1940), 49 U.S.C.

16. 44 M.C.C. 190 (1944).
17. The Commission referred to Monroe Common Carrier Application, 8
M.C.C. 183, 185 (1938), holding that the exemption was not destroyed "where
the only additional use of the motor vehicle is for carrying of other commodities without compensation."
18. 166 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1948).
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mission was irreconcilable with the statutory language as amended
in 1938 and would cripple the legislative policy to free interstate transportation of the favored products from the restraints and delays of
economic regulation. "Relief from this is offered in order to aid the
prompt and free transportation of the named commodities, which
transportation is usually seasonal and intermittent, but often urgent
because it is of perishables. . .

."

Small intrastate truckers-defendant

had only five trucks-constitute "the reserve to be drawn on under this
exemption.... When called on to move ... privileged commodities

to another state they could not afford to buy a new truck for the
purpose . . .nor take the time and trouble . . .to get an authority

from the Commission."'19
According to this decision the exemption applies unless the carrier
transporting exempt commodities also transports nonexempt goods
at the same time in the same vehicle. The Commission refused to accept this rule outside the territory of the Fifth Circuit and began litigation involving the same issue in the Third Circuit 0 against an interstate trucking firm which carried dressed poultry from Maryland to
Chicago pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
In ICC v. Service Trucking Co.,21 the Commission sought to enjoin as
unauthorized defendant's use of its vehicles for transporting eggsconcededly an exempt product-on the return trip. The court, following the Dunn case, agreed with defendant that no authority for the

return haul of eggs was needed, thus making unnecessary a decision
on defendant's additional contention that dressed poultry was also an
exempt commodity.2 2 Since this second defeat the Commission has
consistently held that transportation of agricultural commodities in
19. Id. at 118.
20. TransportationHearings 1950, supra note 10, at 822.
21. 186 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1951), affirming 91 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
22. A determination of that issue was also avoided in ICC v. Woodall
Food Products Co., 112 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1953), aff'd 207 F.2d 517 (5th
Cir., 1953) on the ground that defendant owned the poultry it carried and,
therefore, was exempt as a private carrier. See 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (3) (1952).
23. Hurshel Craig Common Carrier Application, 69 M.C.C. 42, 12 F.C.C.
33,819 (1956); Zero Refrigerated Lines Extension-Meat Products from Several Packing House Points, 12 F.C.C. 33,853 (1957); Herrett Trucking Co.,
Extension-Feeds, 69 M.C.C. 487, 12 F.C.C. 33,845 (1957); J. M. Blythe Common Carrier Application, 66 M.C.C. 560 (1956); West Coast Fast Freight, Inc.,
Extension-Intermediate and Off-Route Points, 11 F.C.C. 33,542 (1956);
Frozen Food Express Extension-West Texas, 71 M.C.C. 321, 12 F.C.C. 33,916
(1957); Kahan Extension-Cut Flowers, 67 M.C.C. 32, 11 F.C.C. 33,583 (1956);
Colonial and Pacific Frigidways, Inc., Extension-Five States, 69 M.C.C. 725,
12 F.C.C. 33,873 (1957): Rail service as to nonexempt transportation found
unsatisfactory "because of slow transit time, inconvenience of holding shipments until full carloads are assembled, inflexibility in making split pickups
and deliveries and difficulty in serving consignees located at off-rail points
or who require less than carload shipments." Applicant preferred to operate
under certificate, fearing that some now exempt commodities may in the
future be removed from exempt classification. Penn-Dixie Lines, Inc., Extension-Western New York, 69 M.C.C. 444 (1957).
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vehicles not used at the same time in carrying nonexempt products is
exempt; operating authority must be obtained only when the carrier
wishes to combine in the same truck mixed shipments of exempt and
nonexempt articles, and such authority will be granted upon the usual
showing of public convenience and necessity with respect to transportation of the latter.2 3
Consequently, the Dunn and Service Trucking Co. cases forced the
Commission to consider each vehicle rather than the total operations
of the carrier as the test in the application of the exemption. In other
words, the same carrier may and frequently does combine regulated
and unregulated operations.24 Sometimes, the combination occurs in
the same truck, as in Direct Transit Lines, Inc., Extension-Unmanufactured Agricultural Commodities.5 Transit held authority to haul
exempt and nonexempt commodities in certain designated areas. In
reply to much demand for such service, it proposed to transport lessthan-truckload shipments of both types of products in the same truck,
dropping off the nonexempt articles at points which it was authorized
to serve and continuing with the exempt commodities to points beyond.
The Commission dismissed the application on the ground that applicant
needed no authority to carry out its plan, but observed that it considered this undesirable, and "the remedy for the inherent evils of
such operations is in legislation." It might be added, however, that the
practice thus condemned permits regulated carriers to compete with
unregulated carriers by invading the domain of those whose entire
operations are in the exempt classification. This may be a partial answer to the complaints of the regulated truckers about unfair and
unequal treatment.
The Commission's dislike for scrambling of regulated and exempt
loads in the same truck is based on the difficulty of supervising such
a system. 26 These difficulties became apparent when the question arose
as to whether rates and tariffs must be filed for agricultural products
which move in mixed shipments. In Fawley Motor Lines v. Cavalier
Poultry Corp.,27 a successful suit by a shipper against a carrier for
recovery, with interest, of charges not provided for in defendant's fied
tariffs, a majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit stated:

If vehicles are used for carrying other [non-exempt] property for compensation, tariffs must be prescribed for the agricultural products so carried as well as for the other property; and these tariffs must, of course, be
24. See cases cited note 23 supra.
25. 62 M.C.C. 231 (1953).

26. See TransportationHearings 1950, supra note 10, at 1140-41.

27. 235 F.2d 416, 418 (4th Cir., 1956), reversing in part 138 F. Supp. 583
(W. D. Va. 1955). See also St. Germain v. Alamo Motor Lines, 12 F.C.C. 81,170
(5th Cir. 1958).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL.. 11

observed with respect to the agricultural products as well as to the other
property.

Judge Soper suggested in a concurring opinion that defendant was
bound by the tariff which became part of its contract with the shipper,
but that the act does not require filing of tariffs applicable to exempt
goods. Under this view the filing of a tariff covering an exempt commodity would be an expensive mistake. The Commission seems to
agree with the majority, probably on the ground that the Dunn and
Service Trucking Co., cases compel such a result. In the Motor Carrier
Rates New York City Area case2 a trade association asked that established rates remain in effect with respect to wool and mohair in the
grease which had previously been held to fall within the agricultural
exemption. Hence, the Association urged that the Commission's order
requiring cancellation of numerous less-than-truckload commodity
rates should not apply to wool and mohair. The Commission rejected
this argument on the ground that the exemption "applies only when
no nonexempt traffic is transported for compensation in a vehicle at
the same time," but permitted further study by interested parties
"with a view to agreement on reasonable levels of rates." Here, the
advantages of the exemption were lost by reason of the mixing of
exempt with nonexempt goods in the same truck.
Apparently, no figures are available as to how much of such mixing
is actually going on. However, it seems to be assumed that it is of
relatively minor significance by comparison with the number of vehicles carrying only exempt products.29 Many of those vehicles may be
owned by certificated carriers. In any event, the question as to precisely what products are or are not exempt presents the most important and the most bitterly contested issue.
II.
When the bill which later became the Motor Carrier Act reached
the floor of the House it exempted from regulation, except as to safety,
28. 62 M.C.C. 593, 622-23 (1954).

note 10, at 424.

See Transportation Hearings 1952, supra

29. There are approximately 18,000 motor carriers subject to economic
regulation by the Commission. Reply of the Interstate Commerce Commission to Questionnaire of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business,
November 28, 1955, "ICC Administration of the Motor Carrier Act," Hearings
before Select Committee on Small Business, U. S. Senate, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 333 (1955) (hereafter cited as Small Business Hearings). The Commission
stated that 18. 97 common and contract carriers are operating under certificates
and permits; the number of private and exempt carriers is unknown, but the

Commission has records of 9,610 exempt carriers on whom copies of safety

regulations have been served. Id. at 319. 320. In 1950 Commissioner Rogers

estimated that 40,000 carriers having 150,000 power units are used exclusively

in exempt interstate transportation, TransportationHearings 1952, supra note

10, at 442. The testimony of witnesses opposed to the exemption in its present
form was directed against the exempt carriers.
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"motor vehicles when used exclusively in carrying livestock or unprocessed agricultural products." 30 In the debate on the floor it was
pointed out that this "includes all farm commodities produced upon
any farm in the raw state ready for market" 31 and was intended "to
help the farmer and keep him out of any regulation whatsoever in so
far as handling unprocessed agricultural prbducts or livestock on the
farm." 32 Congressman Pierce, himself a farmer, emphasized that even
the fixing of mainimum rates by the Commission in Washington for
taking a truckload of hogs from his farm to the market in an adjoining
state would mean "the death of the motor transportation which the
farmer has had and which has been the only relief that has come to
him from the previous excessive railroad rates."33
This part of the legislative history indicates that the exemption was
established for the benefit of farmers and fishermen. After the bill
became law it was vigorously urged by the regulated carriers that
farmers and fishermen were intended as the sole beneficiaries of the
exemption; it should, therefore, be construed as restricting exempt
vehicles to operations from the farm or landing place to the primary
market or point at which the farmer or fisherman dispose of their
products, and that the commodities should be subject to full regulation after they have entered ordinary channels of commerce. This socalled "channels of commerce" principle was, indeed, applied by the
Commission in its first and second report in Monark Egg Corporation
Contract Carrier Application, 4 where it held that shucked oysters,
gutted and filleted fish, shelled pecans and shelled walnuts and dressed
poultry were not exempt. Referring to the fact that "the ordinary fisherman sells his catch at the pier," that the applicant's fish products
were processed in processing plants, and that the drawing of distinctions between various forms of processing would involve "distinctions
so subtle as to be wholly impractical," the Commission concluded that
"only fish and shellfish dead or alive, as taken from the water, are
within the purview of this exemption."3' 5 Similarly, peanuts sold in the
shell by the farmer were exempt only until they reach the shelling
plant.3 6
30. 79

CONG.

31. Ibid.
32.

REC. 12205 (1935). Fish and shellfish were added later.

Id. at 12213.

33. Id. at 12217.

34. 26 M.C.C. 615, 618 (1940), 44 M.C.C. 15, 18, 19 (1944): "The legislative
history indicates that the benefits of the exemption were intended for the
farmer by affording relief in the transportation of his products to the point
where they first enter the ordinary channels of commerce. Before adopting the
exemption, Congress broadened it by including fish and shellfish within
its scope, and the natural and logical inference to be drawn from this action
is that a like relief was intended for the fisherman as was granted the farmer."
35. 44 M.C.C. at 21.
36. Id. at 19.
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The "channels of commerce" doctrine did not long survive as a rule
of interpretation because it could not be supported by the legislative
history, let alone by the plain language of the statute. The only
canon of construction in its favor, that exemptions should be strictly
construed, was not very helpful because the language does not even
contain a remote hint as to geographical points of departure and destination of the exempt transportation. 37 The ambiguous clause "(not
including manufactured products thereof)" does not apply to fish but
only to "agricultural commodities," as the Commission itself acknowledged in the second Monark Egg report;38 that clause was substituted
for the words "unprocessed agricultural products" used in the original
bill.
The substitution occurred at the conclusion of a debate about the
scope of the exemption and general agreement that the term "unprocessed" was too narrow. 39 The present language was proposed by Congressman Pettengill who said:
...we have heard a good deal of discussion... as to what is a processed
agricultural product, whether that would include pasteurized milk or
ginned cotton. It was not the intent of the committee that it should
include those products. Therefore, to meet the views of many members
we thought we would strike out the word "unprocessed" and make it
apply only to manufactured products.
Mr. Whittington: In other words, under the amendment ... cotton in bales
and cottonseed transported from the ginneries to the market or to a
public warehouse would be exempt if the language remained, because
ginning is sometimes synonymous with processing.
Mr. Pettengill:That is correct.40
In 1951 this colloquy was brought to the attention of the Commission
in the course of an investigation instituted on their own motion into
the meaning of the agricultural exemption. In that proceeding, known
as the Determinationcase,41 the Commission abandoned the "channel
of commerce" principle. Said the Commission:
Although the object of the partial exemption as originally framed was
to aid the farmer in marketing his products, the substitution of the present
37. By contrast, 49 U.S.C. § 303(b) (4a) explicitly provides for exemption

of vehicles owned by farmers "when used in the transportation of . . . com-

modities ...or in the transportation of supplies to his farm."
38. 44 M.C.C. at 17-18: "A comma is placed after 'livestock,' again after
'fish (including shellfish),' and again after 'agricultural commodities (not
including the manufactured products thereof).' We conclude that each of
the terms set off by commas is a complete commodity description."
39. 79 CONG. REC. 12205 (1935).
40. Id. at 12220. The vote adopting the amendment followed.
41. Determination of Exempted Agricultural Commodities, 52 M.C.C. 511
(1951).
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language for the words "unprocessed agricultural products" clearly
resulted in a broadening of the exemption. That this is so was made plain
by the chairman of the subcommittee sponsoring the amendment when
he stated that pasteurized milk and ginned cotton were intended to come
within the partial exemption. He also indicated that cottonseed would
fall within the exemption. It must be assumed that Congress was familiar
with the practices obtaining in the industry incidental to the marketing
of these and other agricultural commodities. As hereinafter shown, the
uncontradicted evidence ... is that pasteurization, among other processing,
and bottling of milk for sale to consumers, is customarily done at dairies
in the larger cities ... and that the bulk of the cottonseed is sold by the
farmer to the ginners. In the light of these practices . .. and the clear
intent of Congress [as to pasteurized milk and cottonseed]

. . . it is

difficult to conclude that Congress intended that other agricultural commodities, processed (but not manufactured)

or packaged for consumer

use, regardless of ownership, should be treated differently. 42

In the same proceeding the Commission held that the term "agricultural commodities" as used in 49 U.S.C.A. §303 (b) (6)
embraces all products raised or produced on farms by tillage and cultivation of the soil (such as vegetables, fruits and nuts); forest products;
live poultry and bees; and commodities produced by ordinary livestock,43
live poultry and bees (such as milk, wool, eggs, and honey).44
The term "(not including manufactured products thereof)" was explained as meaning
agricultural commodities in their natural state and those which, as a result
of treating or processing, have not acquired new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations. 45
The "channel of commerce" principle was also discarded with respect to the interpretation of the word "fish" after the Commission's
application of that principle in the Monark Egg CorporationApplication4 6 had been disapproved by the Fifth Circuit in ICC v. Love.47 In
that case the Commission sought to enjoin transportation without
authority of fresh, headless shrimp, packed in ice, and frozen headless
shrimp. It was found that heading of shrimp was deemed necessary
42. 52 M.C.C. at 523-24. The Commission added that pasteurized milk,
ginned cotton and cottonseed "were intended to be illustrative of the types of
processing permissible under the ... exemption as now phrased." The Commission concluded that the channel of commerce doctrine "is not appropriate
for use in determining the applicability of the... exemption." Id. at 525.
43. As defined in 49 U.S.C. § 20(11). The word "ordinary" was inserted
before the word "livestock" (54 Stat. 921 (1940)) for the purpose of clarifying
that reference.
44. 52 M.C.C. at 519.
45. Id. at 521.
46. See note 34 supra.
47. 77 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. La. 1948), a'd per curiam, 172 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.
1949).
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by the industry prior to shipment to markets, and that fresh headless
shrimp was taken to quick-freezing plants and thence transported by
defendant's trucks to the East. The court observed that "shrimp, as
handled by defendant... continue to be shrimp in their natural state,"
that the Commission's holdings "would nullify the exemption . . .
because no shrimp are transported to market which are not beheaded,"
and that the word "fish" in the statute must be given "its ordinary and
commonly understood meaning, the meaning which is used in transportation parlance.. . ." It "includes fish in the various forms in which
it is customarily shipped, when not packed in hermetically sealed
containers."4
This decision compelled the Commission to reopen and reverse its
previous holding in the Monark Egg CorporationApplication. 49 Indeed
in its third report in that case the Commission observed that "the
major part of the total catch of fish and shellfish is subjected to some
processing at the pier before being moved to market" and "a sound
distinction cannot be made between fresh and frozen headless shrimp
and other species of fresh and frozen fish which are transported to
market both in the form in which they are taken from the water and
in other forms such as gutted fish, fillets, shucked oysters, etc." 50 In
its fourth and final report in April 1951 the Commission stated that
the "channels of commerce" or "movement to primary market" principle, held inapplicable to agricultural products in the Determination
case, was "equally inapplicable" to fish.51
The posture of the law as of the Spring of 1951 may thus be summarized as follows: First: It was admitted that not only producers
(farmers and fishermen), but also processors were intended to benefit
from the exemption in that they could avail themselves of unregulated
truck transportation. Second: The exemption does not apply to truck
transportation of products which have passed from mere processing to
manufacturing. The question when that transformation takes place
was examined in detail and answered with respect to all types of agricultural products in the Determination case,52 the findings in that
48. 77 F. Supp. at 67. The Court quoted the dissent of Commissioner Lee
in the second Monark Egg report, 44 M.C.C. at 22-23.
49. 49 M.C.C. 693 (1949); 52 M.C.C. 576 (1951).
50. 49 M.C.C. at 698.
51. 52 M.C.C. at 581. The finding was that "fish (including shellfish)"

means "frozen, quick frozen and unfrozen fish and shellfish in the various
forms in which it is shipped, such as live fish, fish in the round, beheaded and
gutted fish, filleted fish, beheaded shrimp, and oysters, clams, crabs, and
lobsters, with or without shells, including crab meat and lobster meat, but
excluding fish and shellfish in hermetically sealed containers and fish and
shellfish which have been otherwise treated for preserving such as smoked,
salted, pickled, spiced, corned, or kippered." Id. at 582.
52. 52 M.C.C. at 527-34 (vegetables and fruits), 534-36 (cereals), 536-37
(forage crops), 537-39 (nuts and peanuts), 539-41 (fiber crop), 541-42 (tobacco), 542-43 (seeds), 543-49 (poultry and livestock), 549-51 (dairy), 551-53
(forest group), 555 (miscellaneous).
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case contain a list of fourteen specifically described groups which
53
the majority of the Commission held included in the exemption.
The subsequent battles have been fought on the issue whether the
Commission correctly drew the line between processing and manufacturing.
III.
The controlling case is East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v.
Frozen Food Express, 4 decided by the United States Supreme Court
on April 23, 1956. The proceeding began before the Commission upon
complaint by East Texas and two other motor common carriers who
alleged that defendant, Frozen Food, was engaged without authority in
truck transportation of fresh and frozen dressed meats and meat products and fresh and frozen dressed poultry. Frozen Food was a duly
certificated motor carrier in interstate commerce, but its certificate
did not cover the named commodities. The Commission entered a cease
and desist order against defendant, holding that "the exemption of
vehicles used in carrying ordinary livestock does not extend to fresh
or frozen meats, the products of the slaughter of such livestock."'55
view in the Determination
The Commission also adhered to its prior
56
case that only live poultry was exempt.
On appeal a three-judge court sustained the Commission with respect to fresh and frozen meats, 57 and defendant then acquiesced in
that holding which may now be considered settled law.5 8 However,
the court reversed in so far as fresh and frozen -dressed poultry was
concerned, 59 and the Commission appealed to the Supreme Court, the
Secretary of Agriculture and the Department of Justice opposing the
53. 52 M.C.C. at 557-58.

See also the appendix, id.

at 564-66:

"List of

Commodities held exempt or non-exempt by the Commission, division 5, or
by the Bureau of Motor Carriers under Section 203(b) (6) of the Interstate
Commerce Act."
54. 351 U.S. 49 (1956).
55. 62 M.C.C. 646, 651 (1954).
56. Id. at 652; 52 M.C.C. at 557.
57. Frozen Food Express v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 374, 380-81 (S.D.
Tex. 1955): The term "ordinary livestock" as defined in section 20(11) of
the Interstate Commerce Act '"may not be tortured to include the carcasses
of slaughtered meat animals.... Nor may meat, fresh or frozen, be considered
an agricultural commodity for present purposes. The exemption has treated
the live meat animal in a separate generic class . . . since the enactment of
the statute. .. "
58. In Frozen Food Express v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.

Tex. 1956) the same court again held that slaughtered cattle, fresh meat and
meat products were nonexempt; the United States Supreme Court aff'd per
curiam, 355 U.S. 6 (1957). To the same effect is ICC v. R. J. Rollette, 11 F.C.C.
81,023 (N.D. Ill. 1955).

59. Frozen Food Express v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 374, 379-81 (S.D.
Tex. 1955). The court referred with approval to ICC v. Allen E. Kroblin, Inc.,
113 F. Supp. 599 (N.D. Iowa, 1953), aff'd, 212 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 836 (1955), which held that dressed and eviscerated poultry
was exempt. In the proceeding before the Commission in East Texas Motor
Freight v. Frozen Food Express, 62 M.C.C. 646 (1954), the Commission had
refused to follow the Kroblin case.
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appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, four Justices dissenting. Mr.
Justice Douglas, for the majority, referring to the legislative history
outlined above, noted that
victory in the Congress for the exemption was recognition that the price
which the farmer obtains for his products is greatly affected by the
cost of transporting them to the consuming market in their raw state or
after they have become marketable by incidental processing.
Killing, dressing, and freezing a chicken is certainly a change in the
commodity. But it is no more drastic a change than the change which
takes place in milk from pasteurizing, homogenizing, adding vitamin
concentrates, standardizing and bottling. Yet, the Commission agrees that
milk so processed is not a 'manufactured' product.... 52 M.C.C. 511, 551.
A chicken that has been killed and dressed is still a chicken. Removal
of its feathers and entrails has made it ready for market. But we cannot
conclude that this processing which merely makes the chicken marketable
turns it into a manufactured commodity.
At some point processing and manufacturing will merge. But where
the commodity retains a continuing substantial identity through the
processing stage we cannot say that it has been 'manufactured' within
the meaning of § 203 (b) (6).60 (Emphasis added.)
In more recent cases application of this test resulted in reversal
of the Commission and determination of exempt status for frozen
fruits and vegetables, 61 peat moss (even if harvested by commercial
interests rather than the farmer himself, or imported),62 and raw
63
shelled nuts.
60. 351 U.S. at 51-54.
61. Home Transfer & Storage Co. v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 599, 602
(W.D. Wash. 1956): "The processing of fresh fruits for quick freezing . . . is
essentially nothing but adding sugars, sirups, and as to peaches ascorbic acid,
to better preserve the fruits and improve their color and taste ....
In other
respects . . . these processed fruits and vegetables remain essentially in the
same shape and form as non-processed fruits and vegetables." Aff'd per
curiam 352 U.S. 884 (1956). It should be noted that the Home Transfer &
Storage Company had a certificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission
authorizing transportation of frozen foods and juices. See Home Transfer &
Storage Co., Investigation of Operations, 63 M.C.C. 785 (1955). Upon remand
following the Supreme Court's decision Division 1 held that applicant may
continue to engage in the transportation of frozen fruits and vegetables
without authority so long as they are not transported for compensation in
the same vehicle and at the same time with non-exempt commodities, but
denied applicant's contract carrier application for other frozen foods because
of lack of need and adequacy of existing service. Home Transfer & Storage
Co., Contract Carrier Application, 69 M.C.C. 173 (1956).
62. Premier Peat Moss Corp. v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 169, 174 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 13 (1957). The Commission had refused
to accept the decision pending appeal to Supreme Court, see 69 M.C.C. 653.
63. Consolidated Truck Service v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 814 (D.C.N.J.
1956), reversing 52 I.C.C. 511, 537-39. The Court refused to follow ICC v.
Weldon, 90 F. Supp. 873 (W.D. Tenn. 1950), afd per curiam, 188 F.2d 367 (6th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951), holding shelled peanuts nonexempt
on the ground that Congress intended only to exempt agricultural commodities "in their natural state" and that, in any event, the farmer had parted
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Frozen Foods Express was also a party in another proceeding which
twice reached the United States Supreme Court. The Company had not
participated in the Determination case before the Commission, but
contended that the findings there made deprived it of its right to carry
exempt agricultural commodities to and from all points within the
United States. Accordingly, it filed a complaint in a three-judge court
asking for an injunction against the enforcement of the Commission's
findings. That court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
Commission's findings did not constitute an appealable order.p The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the lower court
for determination on the merits. 65 Upon remand, the three-judge court
held the following commodities exempt because they had undergone
some processing, but retained their original identity:
Frozen whole eggs; dried egg powder; dried egg yolks; clean rice; rice
bean; rice polish; pasteurized milk; fresh cut up vegetables in cellophane
bags; fresh vegetables washed, cleaned and packaged in cellophane bags
or boxes; fruits or vegetables (quick frozen); shelled peanuts; peanuts
shelled ground; killed and picked poultry (although not drawn); rolled
barley; cottonseed hulls; beans (packaged, dried artificially or packed in
small containers for retail trade); dried fruits (dried mechanically or
artificially); peaches peeled, pitted and placed in cold storage in unsealed
containers; strawberries canned in syrup in unsealed containers and placed
in cold storage; milk, skimmed, vitamin D; milk, powdered; buttermilk;
feathers; frozen milk and cream; cotton linters; chopped hay; seeds,
deawned or scarified; redried tobacco leaves.66
67
The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam without opinion.
These staggering defeats for the Commission's advocacy of a broad
concept of manufacturing were, perhaps, foreshadowed by earlier

with his rights on delivery to the shelling plant. The Weldon case can no
longer be considered a precedent because it is inconsistent with East Texas
Motor Freight v. Frozen Food, 351 U.S. 49 (1956), is based on the "channels of
commerce" principle later repudiated, see text to note 42 supra, and seems
irreconcilable even with the reasoning of ICC v. Yeary Transfer Co., 104
F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Ky. 1952), likewise aff'd per curiam by the same Sixth
Circuit in 202 F.2d 151 (1953).
64. Frozen Food Express v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 374, 377-79 (S.D.
Tex. 1955).
65. Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956).
66. Frozen Food Express v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 399, 402-03, (S.D.
Tex. 1956). The Commission had held that only '"milk, cream, and skim milk,
including that which has been pasteurized, standardized milk, homogenized
milk and cream, vitamin "D" milk and vitamin "D" skim milk" are exempt,
52 M.C.C. 557 (1951). It excluded frozen milk-the freezing process converted
it into a manufactured product. Id. at 551.
See also Penn-Dixie Lines, Inc., Extension-Florida Points, 11 F.C.C. 33,690
(1956); Fresh citrus fruit, peeled and cut into sections, and packed in a glass
jar with a screw-type lid held non-exempt. Presumably this is not in conflict
with the Court's decision quoted in the text. The Commission did not acquiesce
in the holding of the Frozen Food Express case prior to its affirmance by the
United States Supreme Court; Erickson Transport Corp. Extension-Additional
Points, 12 F.C.C. 34,036 (1957).
67. 355 U.S. 6 (1957).
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judicial and even legislative actions. Thus it was held that scoured
wool was exempt; the scouring process consisted of removing grease
and water from raw wool; this was said not to change the form of the
raw wool.68 Similarly, the expensive process of redrying tobacco,
usually performed in plants owned by persons other than the growers,
was characterized as a mere processing rather than as manufacturing
operation, there being "no visible difference in the leaf tobacco which
is about to be redried and that which has been redried. 69 The Commission's conclusion in the Determination case that nursery stock, flowers
and bulbs were not included in the exemption 70 provoked not only
litigation,7 1 but vigorous complaints to Congress by the American Association of Nurserymen and the Society of American Florists 2 resulting in the amendment which inserted after "agricultural" the words
"(including horticultural)."73 In only one instance did the Commis-

sion's view prevail: A conviction for transportation of cowhides without a certificate was affirmed. 74
In its recent decisions the Commission has, of course, followed, albeit
reluctantly, the "substantial identity" test established by the Supreme
Court. 75 Nevertheless, further litigation as to how that test should be
68. ICC v. Wagner, 112 F. Supp. 109 (M.D. Tenn. 1953). The Commission

acquiesced in this ruling: Determination of Exempted Agricultural Commodities, 62 M.C.C. 87 (1953).
69. ICC v. Yeary Transfer Co., 104 F. Supp. 245, 246 (E.D. Ky., 1952), aff'd
per curiam 202 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1953). The Commission acquiesced, 62 M.C.C.
87, 88 (1953).
70. 52 M.C.C. at 555.
71. Florida Gladiolus Growers Ass'n. v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 525
(S.D. Fla. 1952) (decided after the amendment of the exemption: Gladiolus
and gladiolus bulbs held exempt).
72. Transportation Hearings 1952, supra note 10, at 380-92, 406-08. In
conversation with one of the witnesses Senator Tobey suggested that the
committee's chairman might ask the Commission: "How in the devil did you
make such a fool decision as that?" (Id. at 384). Senator Bricker observed
that horticulture and nursery work are taught in the agricultural colleges of
the country. (Id. at 385).
73. 66 STAT. 479, 49 U.S.C. § 302(b) (4a), (6) (1952).
74. Southwestern Trading Co. v. United States, 208 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1953)
(hides like fresh meat are the product of slaughter and, therefore, not "ordinary livestock.") See notes 57, 58 supra. The only other case in which the
Commission was victorious is ICC v. Weldon, 90 F. Supp. 814 (W.D. Tenn.
1950), supra, note 63 which, for the reasons there stated, is now obsolete.
75. Bonney Motor Express, Inc., Extension-Peanuts to Nebraska, 69 M.C.C.
480 (1957) (raw shelled peanuts exempt); Querner Truck Lines, Inc., Extension, 12 F.C.C. 33,942 (1957) (same); Zero Refrigerated Lines, ExtensionMeat Products from Several Packing House Plants, 12 F.C.C. 33,853 (1957)
(follows Home Transfer & Storage Co. v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 599
(W.D. Wash. 1956) and the East Texas case with respect to frozen fruits and
vegetables and dressed poultry); Hurshel Craig Common Carrier Application,
69 M.C.C. 42 (1956) (shelled corn, whether shelled at farm or in elevator);
Penn-Dixie Lines Extension-Western New York, 69 M.C.C. 444 (1957) (Home
Transfer & Storage, supra. followed after affirmance by Supreme Court);
Herrett Trucking Co., Extension-Feeds, 69 M.C.C. 487 (1957) (mixed feed
oats and feed screenings exempt, but "pelletized ground refuse screenings,
distillers' residues, fish and copra meals nonexempt). In Penn-Dixie Lines,
Inc., Extension-Rice, 12 F.C.C. 34,097 (1957), reversing the prior report in
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applied with respect to commodities whose status has not yet been
judicially determined is possible and, therefore, some uncertainty may
6

still exist.7

IV.
At this point we must examine the arguments and the evidence
presented to the Congress by proponents and opponents of legislation
which would reverse the present law.
Complete repeal of the exemption is favored by prominent spokesmen for the railroads,77 but seems to have no other support.78 On the
66 M.C.C. 30 (1955), Division 1 held exempt "cleaned rice" which had undergone a heating, drying, hulling and milling process. The holding was "Without

prejudice to reconsideration . . . in the event that subsequent judicial or

legislative action requires a return to our original holding." Continuing
denials of exempt status for fruit juices on the ground that they are manufactured products would seem to be consistent with court decisions. See Watkins
Motor Lines, Inc., Interpretation of Certificate, 11 F.C.C. 33,692 (1956), affirming prior report by Division 1, 64 M.C.C. 455, 459 (1955); J. M. Blythe Com-

mon Carrier Application, 66 M.C.C. 560 (1956); Colonial and Pacific Frigidways, Inc. Extension-Five States, 69 M.C.C. 725; 12 F.C.C. 33,873 (1957).
See also, J. D. Lewis Common Carrier Application, 69 M.C.C. 603 (1957) (lumber not exempt). Commission rulings handed down prior to April 23, 1956, the
date of the Supreme Court's decision in the East Texas Motor Freight case,
must, of course, be treated with caution. See, West Coast Fast Freight, Inc.,
Extension-Intermediate and Off-Route Points, 11 F.C.C. 33,542 (1956) (split
peas in bags held non-exempt). This is contra to Frozen Food Express v.
United States. See text to note 66 supra. As to the relationship between exempt transportation and the proviso of 49 U.S.C. § 306(a) (1952), see Peters
'Common Carrier Application, 12 F.C.C.'34,156 (1957).
76. In W. W. Hughes, Extension-Frozen Foods, 12 F.C.C. 33,935 (1957)
applicant had a 10 year old certificate authorizing transportation of fresh and
frozen fish and shell fish, fresh frog legs and fresh fruits and vegetables. After
ICC v. Love, 77 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. La. 1948) affd per curiam, 172 F.2d 224 (5th
Cir. 1949), he thought he was entirely exempt, and failed to comply with the
terms of his certificate which was revoked in 1949. Since then, applicant
continued to transport these and newly developed frozen food items, acting
on advice of counsel. His instant application was filed at urging of the Bureau
of Motor Vehicles. At the time of the Commission's order Frozen Food Express
v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Tex. 1956), was still pending in the
Supreme Court. Hence, the Commission held nonexempt, pending further
court action: Frozen strawberries and other purees, frozen french fried
potatoes, frozen candied sweet potatoes, frozen eggs and egg yolks, frozen
meats, frozen deviled crabs, deviled clams, fried scallops, ready-to-fry and
fried oysters, fried fish fillets, fish sticks, codfish cakes, seafood dinners, deviled
lobsters and salmon croquettes. With respect to these the application was
denied. Some of these commodities may still be non-exempt; with respect to
others it may be doubtful to what extent they are sufficiently different from
the fish products held exempt in the fourth Monark Egg Corp. Contract Carrier Application, report, 52 M.C.C. 576 (1951).
77. Helmetag, supra note 10; Statement of W. L. Grubbs, General Counsel,
Louisville &Nashville Railroad Co., for the Association of American Railroads

and the Railroad Industry in general, Transportation Hearings 1950, supra

note 10, at 241. Mr. Grubbs suggested that repeal would not harm the
farmers who remain protected by the exemptions in section 203 (b) (4a) and
(5). See text to note 5, supra. However, most farmers do not own or control
any vehicles. See statement of H. M. Nicholson, U. S. Department of Agriculture, TransportationHearings 1952, supra note 10, at 442: "That the farmer
is not in the transportation business may be fully realized when it is considered,
for example, that 147,000 farms in Wisconsin sell milk, but only 56,000 such
farms have their own trucks, and that 148,000 farms in Kentucky produce
tobacco, but only 50,000 farms have trucks of their own." See also, id. at 395.
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other hand, bills which would re-establish the narrow scope of the
exemption as originally contemplated by the Commission have been
repeatedly introduced 9 but failed of enactment up to this time. As
previously noted, these bills reflect the wishes of the regulated carriers, particularly the truckers, who keep pressing for "legislative
relief to correct the widening of the agricultural exemption by court
decisions and to prevent any further spread of exempt carriage." 80
One basis for this demand was the practice of trip-leasing. Since the
movement of agricultural products is generally one-way, from the
place of production or processing to market, the trucks may be empty
on the return trip, with possibly lethal consequences for the business
of carriers specializing in transportation of exempt goods. In order to
meet this problem, exempt haulers entered into "trip leasing" agreements permitting "utilization by motor common and contract carriers
(under leases, contracts, or other arrangements) of vehicles not owned
by them-a practice generally limited to a one-way or round trip
movement of property in a vehicle leased with the driver ....81
Leasing was not confined to exempt carriers, but was also used in
transactions in which both lessor and lessee were regulated truckers.
The Commission found this objectionable; particularly, it appeared
that safety requirements were not observed by lessors, that lesseecarriers failed to inspect the equipment offered, and that the informal
relationships between the parties-often without benefit of a written
contract-permitted evasions of geographical restrictions in the certificates of the lessees.82 Regulated truckers particularly assailed tripleasing by the exempt carriers on the additional ground that it encouraged cut-rate competition which tended to break down the rate
structure,83 and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf78. See Fulda, The Agricultural Exemption in the Motor CarrierAct Should
Not Be Repealed, 43 VA. L. REV. 677 (1957).
79. See the discussion of these proposals in the opinion of Judge Graven in
ICC v. Allen E. Kroblin, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 599, 611-13, 615, 620-21, 629-30.
(N.D. Iowa 1953). As to the bills now pending in the 85th Congress, see note
11, supra.No hearings were held during 1957. Testimony has been presented to
the Senate Subcommittee on the problems of surface transportation. See
New York Times, Feb. 21, 1958, p. 33, col. 1.
80. Statement of Policy, adopted by Executive Committee of American
Trucking Associations, Inc., January 25, 1957.
81. H. R.REP. No. 2425, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1956). See ICC v.Allen E.
Kroblin, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 599, 602-03 (N.D. Iowa 1953).
82. Lease and Interchange of Vehicles by Motor Carriers, 52 M.C.C. 675
(1951); 64 M.C.C. 361 (1955).
83. Transportation Hearings 1952, supra note 10, at 377-78; Transportation
Hearings 1950, supra note 10, at 859. See also, Statement by Howard G.
Mathews, president of Mathews Trucking Corp. Id. at 758:
"As a result [of the Love decision] our balance of operations has been
adversely affected to a point where we are unable to give service to our eastbound shippers because of the heavy losses in deadheading equipment back
to the Middlewest and Southern states. The problem we are up against,
particularly in New England, is this: The 'gypsy' operator calls upon a
shipper of fish and will take the load at any price he can get. Itamounts to
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feurs and Warehousemen joined in this attack.84 This led to the adoption of rules by the Commission which required at least thirty days'
duration of every lease by an authorized carrier of a vehicle for operation by the owner for the carrier and forbade computation of compensation on the basis of a percentage of revenues earned by the lessee
with the leased equipment. The validity of these rules was sustained
by the Supreme Court in a five to two decision in American Trucking
Associations, Inc. v. United States, 85 in spite of the fact that they would
86
make trip-leasing by agricultural haulers practically impossible.
Subsequent pressure on the Commission by farm groups forced it to
suspend application of the thirty-days minimum lease requirement for
agricultural carriers. But this was not enough for the farmers who
demanded a statutory guaranty.87 Accordingly, an amendment to section 204 of the Interstate Commerce Act, approved on August 3, 1956,
gave to the Commission authority to regulate the use of vehicles owned
by others, but explicitly prohibited regulations as to the duration of
any such lease or the amount of compensation to be paid therefor
where the leased vehicle "is one which has completed a movement
covered by section 203 (b) (6) ... and such motor vehicle is next to
be used by the motor carrier in a loaded movement in any direction,
and/or in one or more of a series of movements, loaded or empty, in
the general direction of the general area in which such motor vehicle
is based." 88 Significantly, the House Report recommended enactment
of this provision because of its
great importance to agriculture and the public, since it would permit the
continuation of a flexible and efficient motor transportation service for
the marketing of agricultural products which has been threatened with
extinction by the Interstate Commerce Commission. This legislation
no more than expense money on his return trip." Another witness put it this
way: "[T]he sort of wildcatter who hauls without any regulation ... usually
starts looking around for some sort of back-haul, and the rate-cutting angle
is still worse then because since he figures he is returning empty anyhow
that it does not cost him anything to haul, so whatever he gets is that much
profit, and where he can offer such a tremendous rate he can nearly always
find someone who is willing to give him freight to haul. . . ." Id. at 781.
84. Transportation Hearings 1950, supra note 10, at 1218. The witness

for the union referred to exempt carriers as "gypsy" or "wildcatter" who
"bangs around the country in his piece of equipment which he has usually
purchased on time and on which he is usually behind on the payments." He
asserted that these people flagrantly violate all safety regulations, drive unduly
long hours and thus cause "murder on the highways." Id. at 1220.
85. 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
86. Id. at 317-18. And see Mr. Justice Black's dissent, id. at 330-32.
87. H. R. REP. No. 2425, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1956).
88. 70 STAT. 983 (1956), 49 U.S.C. § 304(f) (Supp. IV, 1957). In Christian v.
United States, 152 F. Supp. 561, 567 (D.Md. 1957), the court, rejecting the
contention that section 304(f) was unconstitutional, said: "The peculiar problems of agriculture have been frequently recognized in exemptions from
regulatory statutes, and such exemptions have been held not to invalidate
those statutes."
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would also implement the "agricultural exemptions" contained in Section
203 (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act.89
This emphatic congressional endorsement of the exemption was delivered at a time when its broad judicial interpretations had already
reached their peak.9 0
Nevertheless, the regulated carriers insist that it is unfair to permit
"the so-called exempt or gypsy carrier"9 1 to take business away from
92
them. They state that their costs of operations are infinitely higher;
therefore, it is easy for the exempt carriers to offer lower rates to
shippers.9 3 The result is said to be either severe losses or even bank89. H. R. REP. No. 2425, supra note 87, at 2.
90. The report quoted in the text is dated June 25, 1956. Although it does
not mention the Supreme Court's decision in East Texas Motor Freight v.
Frozen Food, 351 U.S. 49 (1956), handed down two months earlier, it would
seem to be improbable that the Committee was ignorant of that decision.
91. Statement of 0. H. Hendrickson, Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express,
Transportation Hearings 1950, supra note 10, at 766: "These . . . operators
entered the field without proper financing and with little or no experience
and, as a result, the financial mortality rate has been very high and they
have . . . injured the trucking industry, as a whole, due to their (1) nonpayment of purveyors for service and supplies rendered them, and (2)
nonpayment of taxes to state regulatory bodies, and (3) non-settlement of
public liability, property damage and cargo claims rendered against them."
This witness admitted, that these carriers are subject to licensing and taxing
by the states, but contended that enforcement of state laws against them
"is an impossibility." Id. at 767. These accusations were vigorously denied by
witnesses for farm and fisheries groups. Id. at 1263-64; TransportationHearings 1952, supra note 10, at 397-400.
92. Statement of D. G. MacDonald, General Counsel, Refrigerated Carriers
Association, in TransportationHearings 1952, supra note 10, at 503:
"Principal among the expenses borne by the regulated carrier (even when
transporting an exempt load) and not incurred by the average itinerant
owner-operator are the following: (1) cost of preventative maintenance; (2)
cost of supervising transportation and maintaining safety program, including
examining and training drivers and safety patrol work; (3) pay for union
helper loading and unloading; (4) full union pay scale for drivers; (5) extra
pay for waiting time; (6) employee benefits of group insurance, etc.; (7)
cost of branch terminals for checking equipment, serving shippers on tracers,
claims, etc.; (8) cost of tariff publication, and distribution; (9) cost of maintaining claim agent, processing claims and payment of uninsured claims;
(10) cargo insurance; (11) public liability and property damage insurance
in adequate limits; (12) workmen's compensation insurance; (13) general
and administrative expense, including accounting department, communication
expense and law expense; (14) State fuel taxes based on reporting mileages;
(15) Federal and State unemployment charges; (16) social security payments
by employers or employees; (17) office rents. In addition, such owneroperators customarily do not collect, report and pay the 3 per cent Federal
transportation tax, which, when not collected from the shipper, becomes the
carrier's obligation.
"These services and facilities, which the regulated carrier provides, all
cost money and they all are provided in conformity with the requirements
of law, the best interest of labor, the needs of the shippers, and protection
for the public."
93. The General Counsel of the National Fisheries Institute stated: "The
rate per 100 pounds of frozen fish from any point in the Northwest to Chicago
... via exempt truck is $1.94 as compared to $2.85 with regulated service ...
our exempt rate to St. Louis is $2.04... as compared to the regulated rate of
$2.70." TransportationHearings 1950, supra note 10, at 1264. Mr. MacDonald
testified in the same Hearings about shippers' pressure for lower rates due to
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ruptcy, 94 or depression of rates on exempt commodities accompanied

by higher rates for other articles.9 5
These arguments were ineffective. Indeed, in the 1956 legislation
Congress, by clear implication, gave its blessing to the lower rates of
the exempt carriers. If trip-leasing had been made more difficult for
them, their rates would have been forced upward and their competitive advantages vis-a-vis the regulated carriers would have disappeared.96 In that event, farmers would have been deprived of the benefit of the exemption which, to quote a former head of the Antitrust
Division,
means more and more farmers can bargain directly with enterprising
small independent truckers over prices, and other terms of service. Thus
the services they want can be tailored, on a flexible case by case basis,
to farmers' special needs. For these reasons the Department of Justice's
actions attacking the Commission's constriction of the exemption is of real
97
importance to every agricultural sector of our economy.

The need of the farmer shipper for such "personalized and individualized service" 98 and the inability or unwillingness of many regulated
carriers to supply such service, have been repeatedly stressed by representatives of farm organizations 99 and the Department of Agriculthe availability of exempt transportation. Id. at 809. In the 1952 Hearings he
said:
"[A]fter the Love decision the exempt truckers entered the field, cut the
rates, and there was twice as much service as the shippers could use. Some
of the regulated carriers tried to ignore the rate-cutting, maintained their
rates and lost more than half of their business. One large New England
carrier, which transported 52,000,000 pounds of fisheries products from New
England in the preceding year, lost 62 per cent of its volume in 6 months.
Since then the regulated carriers have tried to meet the rates and their
operations have become unprofitable." Transportation Hearings 1952, supra
note 10, at 502.
94. TransportationHearings 1950, supra note 10, at 769, 789, 805; Transportation Hearings 1952, supra note 10, at 376, 377, 502. Mr. MacDonald stated the
eleven member carriers of the Refrigerated Carriers Association "have
suffered material economic hardship" since the Love case: "one has become
bankrupt, two others had large operating losses during 1951 and none has
escaped major financial reverses." Id. at 496.
95. Testimony of Edgar S. Idol, General Counsel, American Trucking
Associations, Transportation Hearings 1952, supra note 10, at 377:
"[Tioday, however, more and more regulated carriers ... have competed
for business on a day-to-day basis against the exempt carrier. On the Pacific
Coast, there have been fluctuations within 2-week periods of over 100 per cent
in trucking rates, with obvious results on operating ratios and profits. The
depressed rates on exempt commodities are bound to be reflected somewhere
else in the rate pattern."
96. The Commission had intended to bring this about. See American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 332 (1953).
97. Statement of Judge Barnes, then Assistant Attorney-General, Anti-trust
Division, Small Business Hearings, supra note 29, at 141, 154.
98. Statement of M. Triggs, American Farm Bureau Federation, Small
Business Hearings,supra note 29, at 114.
99. Small Business Hearings,supra note 29, at 102-26, 251-54; Transportation
Hearings 1952, supra note 10, at 393-406, 408-20, 449-60.
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ture; 10 0 they have pointed out that the perishability of the products
requires fast and immediately available transportation in all directions,101 that railroads usually do not or cannot pick up shipments at
the farm, that many regulated truckers do not have loading facilities
in farm areas 102 and have no interest in providing the necessary "transportation pool on which farmers can call to meet seasonal requirements."'103 Moreover, the regulated truckers are confined to the areas
specified in their certificates or permits and, therefore, could not take
on or distribute loads at "so many divergent points ... like a spider
web. 1' 0 4 In short, the type of service needed "cannot wait for action
from Washington to grant permits or certificates for operating authority."' 05 It should be added that assertions of severe losses on the
part of regulated carriers have been questioned because of the general
growth of the trucking industry. 106
All this appears to be persuasive with respect to the need for the
exemption to secure the legitimate interests of farmers and fishermen.
But it does not directly answer the argument that only farmers and
fishermen should benefit from the exemption because extension of
those benefits to commercial processing interests is unfair and unjustified. Indeed, in its 70th Annual Report the Commission recommended
return to the channels-of-commerce principle, 107 and this recommendation would be carried out by enactment of bills introduced in the
1st Session of the 85th Congress. These would provide for exemption
100. TransportationHearings 1952, supra note 10, at 439-42; Small Business
Hearings,supra note 29, at 52-58.
101. Transportation Hearings 1952, supra note 10, at 386, 398, 405, 419.
"Farmer's need for transportation is sporadic; but when he needs transportation he needs it badly and on short notice." Id. at 443; Small Business Hearings,
supra note 29, at 104.
102. TransportationHearings 1952, supra note 10, at 397-98, 400, 405. Service
by exempt trucks was said to be three times as fast as by rail. Id. at 419. "The
regulated carrier . . . is interested only in shippers having regular and

frequent shipments." Id. at 442. Railroads were said to have abandoned thousands of miles of branch lines in rural areas. Id. at 447-48, 457-58, 515. See also
Small Business Hearings,supra note 29, at 103-04, 113-14.
103. Small Business Hearings, supra note 29, at 114.
104. TransportationHearings 1952, supra note 10, at 409. As to the significance of geographic and other restrictions as a factor harmful to agriculture
see id. at 390, 394, 398, 409, 441-42. "By following the harvests from one area
to another as the demand for service develops, the exempt trucker fills an
economic need which the certificated regular route or radial hauler ... is not
equipped to perform." Id. at 443. Regulated trucks are less useful "because of
the limited field in which they are permitted to operate." Id. at 447, 459, 468.
See also TransportationHearings 1950, supranote 10, at 759.
105. Small Business Hearings, supra note 29, at 104.
106. Id. at 115; Transportation Hearings 1950, supra note 10, at 915; See
ICC, 70th ANN. REP. 17-21, 44, 187 (1956). The allegations as to the plight of
regulated carriers generally, see note 94 supra, are not documented.
107. ICC, 70th ANN. REP. 162 (1956). The Commission believes that application of the "substantial identity test" to frozen fruits and vegetables would
result in "a serious impairment of the position of the regulated carriers upon
whom small shippers, including farmers, are dependent." As shown in the
text, farmers feel that they are dependent on exempt carriers.
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of vehicles used in carrying ordinary livestock, live poultry, fish or
agricultural (including horticultural) commodities (not including
manufactured products thereof or frozen foods) "from the point of
production to a point where such commodities first pass out of the
actual possession and control of the producer." The "point of production" is defined as "the wharf or landing place at which the fisherman
debarks his catch" and the place where the commodity is "grown,
10 8
raised, or produced" or "gathered for shipment."'
This would be acceptable to the regulated truckers who concede
that "regulation of the movement of agricultural tonnage from points
of production to primary markets or concentration points is impracticable."'109 Presumably, the exclusion of frozen foods from even this
narrow type of exemption would be particularly welcome to them
in view of the "fast-growing frozen food industry," 110 although it may
be illogical to exclude frozen foods when the freezing takes place at
the point of production. In any event, it is obvious that enactment of
this proposal would very substantially curtail the transportation business now open to exempt carriers."1
Previous hearings before Congressional Committees contain much
testimony pertinent to the problem of codifying the channels of commerce doctrine. For instance, the representative of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives acknowledged that the regulated motor
carriers, "realizing their inability to serve the entire needs of the
farmer, only seek a monopoly on the transportation of his products2
after they have reached the first point in the system of distribution.""1
But this was not satisfactory because the interests of agriculture in108. S. 1689 and H.R. 5823, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). A similar proposal
was offered as a substitute bill in 1952, Transportation Hearings 1952, supra
note 10, at 371-72; it was supported by several members of the Commission.
Id. at 425, 428. Attention was called to the North Carolina Motor Carriers of
Property Act, which exempts from State regulation transportation of "farm,
dairy or orchard products from farm, dairy or orchard to warehouse, creamery,
or other original storage or market." N.C. GEN. STAT., § 62-121.8 (1) (d)
(Supp. 1955). The exemption is unrestricted as to "livestock or fish, including
shellfish and shrimp," and "raw products of the forest." Id., § 62-121.8 (1) (f)
and (g). Thus, the North Carolina Act applies the "channels of commerce"
principle only in part; however, the North Carolina Utilities Commission is
authorized to grant exemptions from regulation if it finds that particular
operations do not "substantially . . . affect or impair uniform regulation."

Id., § 62-121.9 (4) (1952). For discussion of the North Carolina law see
Transportation Hearings 1952, supra note 10, at 491-94. Compare Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 4921.02 (A) (5) (Baldwin 1953) (transportation from farm to
market exempt).
109. Transportation Hearings 1952, supra note 10, at 379; Transportation
Hearings 1950, supra note 10, at 790, 809.
110. ICC, 70th AmN. REP. 67 (1956).
111. In most of the court decisions discussed in this article the exemption
was applied to transportation of articles after they had been processed at
points other than the original points of production; the exempt carriers
usually are small businessmen owning but a few trucks. See note 91 supra.
112. Small Business Hearings,supra note 29, at 109.
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volve "not only production on the farm but also processing, distribution and transportation in all its complex ramifications." Hence, the
farmer
is not solely concerned with the initial sale. What happens in the market
two or three times removed from the farmer's initial point of sale is of
major importance as an influence on his ultimate net income. The maintenance of the flexible and economical service afforded by the agricultural
hauler is something that can and should be preserved to help the farmer
help himself... 113

Presumably, the public would also be helped by cheaper transportation. The same witness stressed the necessity of "getting food products
in every city, village, and hamlet in America every day, in the quantities and in the qualities which the housewife wants,"'1 4 a job which
requires "immunity from route limitations for trucks hauling agricultural products.""5 [Emphasis supplied.]
Similarly, a spokesman for the American Farm Bureau Federation
observed that exemption from regulation with respect to rates, routes
and territory was essential "for the efficient marketing of farm products." He noted that "many markets can be reached via common
carrier only by circuitous routing and interchange of equipment, all
involving delay and extra operating and administrative costs;"" 6
particularly products such as dressed poultry which are processed in
numerous small establishments located at many points need transportation to "fan out in all directions." 117
A member of the traffic committee of the National Fisheries Institute
shared these views. Opposing any limitation on the exemption to the
fisherman himself as sole beneficiary, he explained that actual marketing "is performed largely by packers or wholesale distributors located
at convenient central points." 118 They, rather than the fishermen
"determine the market outlets and provide the necessary transporta113. Ibid. To the same effect is the statement of Dr. L. C. Halvorson, The
. . exemption even in those
cases when the commodity is no longer in their possession. Farmers know
the terminal market price, and the price at country points quite directly
reflects the 'freight charges.'" TransportationHearings 1952, supra note 10, at
453.
114. Small Business Hearings,supra note 29, at 110.
115. Id. at 104. See also note 104, supra.
116. Id. at 113. See also statement of Dr. Halvorson, Transportation Hearings 1952, supra note 10, at 459: "Frequently shipments are diverted a number
of times in transit; with each diversion, the necessity for having available
the flexible service of a carrier which is not held to a limited-destination
territory becomes greater." This point was also stressed by the Growers and
Shippers League of Florida. Id. at 464.
117. Small Business Hearings,supra note 29, at 119. Without the exemption,
there might be no common carrier to serve such small establishments, or
only one or two, against whose monopoly position the small processors may
not be able to protect themselves. Id. at 120.
118. TransportationHearings 1952, supra note 10, at 446.
National Grange: "Farmers benefit from the .
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tion facilities to the various markets."" 9 He, too, suggested "that ICCregulated trucks are bound by rules and regulations to a point whereby
they cannot perform the transportation of fish and shellfish as a nonexempt commodity with the flexibility and freedom that is necessary
for prompt movement of these commodities"'120 after their transfer to
wholesalers.
Perhaps there are answers to these plausible arguments against the
channels of commerce doctrine 21 If so, the advocates of legislation
which would revive that doctrine have, -up to the present, failed to
furnish those answers. 122 Moreover, it must be remembered that under
present law, as explained in the first section of this article, the regulated carriers may enjoy the benefits of the exemption with respect
to any of their vehicles used at any one time for exclusive transportation of exempt commodities. Thus, present law permits them to compete with carriers specializing in agricultural hauls free from the
restrictions of economic regulation, and, at least some of them have,
from time to time, availed themselves of that opportunity.123 Hence,
complaints about the ostensible unfairness of maintaining side-by-side
a regulated and a free segment of the motor carrier industry appear
blunted. In any event, a very heavy burden of proof should be required
from those who wish to substitute regulation for the stimulant of free
competition. The foregoing analysis demonstrates, I submit, that that
burden has not been met.
119. Id. at 447.
120. Ibid. See also statement of H. M. Nicholson, Traffic and Management
Division, Production and Marketing Administration, U. S. Dep't of Agric.
opposing a substitute bill similar to the 1957 bills as disrupting marketing
channels. Id. at 442. Mr. Nicholson pointed out that the farmer should have
a choice between near and distant markets.
121. Possibly it could be demonstrated that flexible transportation in all
directions, unhampered by certificate restrictions, is not needed with respect
to some commodities now exempt.
122. The Commission has "never . . . made a comprehensive study to determine the injury... which results from the exemption." Morgan, The Function of Research in a Regulatory Agency, 24 I.C.C. PRCTIONERS' J. 816, 833
(1957). The channels of commerce principle may be workable in intrastate
transportation because of smaller distances. See note 108, supra.
123. See cases cited note 23 supra. In the 1950 Transportation Hearings,
supra note 10, at 805, the General Counsel of the Refrigerated Carriers Association referred to a regulated motor carrier in New England which had "set
up a separate, though commonly controlled, corporation to conduct exempt
operations . . . all over the country." The witness described this as a "bastard
company." One may wonder why he deplored rather than welcomed this
astute and perfectly legal arrangement. The creation of a separate corporate
subsidiary is, of course, not required.

